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Summary
This paper discusses the relationship between money
supply and production in Tanzania, wit special reference
to Macmod, the macroeconomic model for Tanzania.
The relationship between money supply and production
is seen as being neither direct nor simple in nature: the
paper argues that the money supply does not impact
production directly, but via inflation. Other things being
equal, one may consequently expect money supply to
influence inflation, and inflation to affect production.
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3I : Introduction
This paper reports on some observations and reflections made about the relationship
between the aggregate supply of money on the one hand, and the total volume of pro-
duction on the other. The reflections refer to the Tanzanian setting, and were made in
connection with the ongoing revision of Macmod, the macroeconomic model for Tan-
zania constructed with technical assistance from the Chr. Michelsen Institute.
The concrete background for focusing on this particular model and topic is set out in
the following documents:
. "Macroeconomic and budgetar modelling for medium term planning (Phase Il)"
(undated document in respect of the Macmod-model, written by H. K. Nordås,
CMI), where the chapter: The Money Market reads as follows:
As exp1ained in the MACMOD doeumentation, it appears that monetary policy in the past has
been the most effective policy instrment in controlling aggregate demand. The transmission
mechanisms have, however, not been the traditiona1 Keynesian via the interest rate and in-
vestment demand. In order to improve the money market block of the MACMOD, we sugge st
an assessment of recent deve10pments of the financia1 sector and the instrments us ed by the
Bank of Tanzania. The objective of this assessment is to incorporate in the most realistic man-
ner the transmission mechanisms ofmonetary policy in the economy.
In aeeordance with the reeommendations from the re cent technica1 session it wil be exp10red
whether using M3 as the monetary aggregate improves the mode1 projections.
. "Macmod, a macroeconomic model for the Tanzanian economy" (Hildegunn
Kyvik Nordås wIth Arld angelsen. CMI Report R1998:5), where a section of
chapter 3.3 reads as follows:
Before closing this section, it is usefu1 to 100k at how monetary and fise al policy have influ-
enced aggregate demand in the past. To get a very rough idea, we have computed the correla-
tion coeffcients between various eomponents of total expenditure and money supp1y and gov-
ernent final consumption respectively for the period 1987-1996. The results are presented in
tab1e 3.3.




As can be seen from this table, the corre1ation coeffeients between money supp1y and GDP
and consumption are exeeptionally high. The corre1ation between money supply and invest-
ment is, however, negligible and, if anything, slightly negative. This suggests that the trans-
mission mechanism for monetary policy in the not been the traditiona1 Keynesian transmission
via the interest rates and investment. It appears that money supp1y has rather had a direct ef-
fect on private consumption and GDP through net wealth effects. This is probab1y because a
large share of the money demand has been for working capita1 in parastatals and cooperatives
and for credit to governent, which in turn has increased the purehasing power in the econ-
omy. In future, however, the Keynesian transmission mechanism shou1d be expected to be
more prominent as capital markets are deregulated, and governent monetize the budget defi-
cit to a much lesser extent.
Summing up, the assignment drawn up in the two documents cIted above is conse-
quently:
4. to look at the financial instruments us ed by the Bank of Tanzania,
. in order to identify the way in which monetary varables impact production,
. for the ultimate purose of introducing relevant model structures into Macmod.
Il : Monetary matters
Monetary policy objectives and instruments
The Ban of Tanzania (BOT) operates a web site (www.bot-tz.org) containing a lot of
valuable information about monetary matters etc in Tanzania. According to the state-
ments made in that web site:
. The primary objective of the Bank of Tanzania is price stabilty. The Bank there-
fore has the responsibilty ofensuring that it establishes monetary conditions that
are consistent with low and stable inflatíon.
. However, inflation control is not an end in itselj but rather, the means by which
monetary policy contributes to solid economic performance.
. Low infation allows the economy to function more effectively, thereby contribut-
ing to better economic performance over time.
. Inflation control by the Central Bank is done by controllng money supply. The
Bank of Tanzania targets extended broad money, M3, which is defined as total
deposit liabiltíes held by commercial banks, including foreign currency deposits,
because it is the monetary aggregate estímated to have closest relationship with
the rate of infation.
. To influence the chosen monetary aggregate, i.e. M3, the Central Bank normally
controls the base money (reserve money, or central bank money) which is directly
related to money supply.
The above statements, (together which other statements in the BOT web site), make it
abundantly c1ear that the monetar policy of Tanzania has one primary objective: to
maintain low and stable inflation. The importance attached to this target is indicated
by the fact that this is also stated (in the web site) as the primary objective of the Bank
itself, and of all its activities.
The focus on inflation does not, however, imply that price stability is seen as an end
in itself. Rather it is seen as the way in which monetary policy may contribute to eco-
nomic development. Stable and low inflation is seen as an essential precondition for
sustainable economic growth.
The control of the money supply is the main policy instrument used by the Bank in
control controlling inflation. In so doing, BOT uses its direct controlover base money
(reserve money, or central bank money) to influence the extended broad money ag-
gregate (M3). BOT targets M3 because it sees it as the monetary aggregate with the
c10sest relationship to the rate of inflation.
Base money control is not the only weapon in BOT' s arsenaL. The Ban also makes
use of a number of additional monetary instrents in the fight to ensure price stabil-
ity. Thus, according to the BOT web site, the Bank engages in Open Market Opera-
tions, through which it sells and buys governent securities (e.g. Treasury bils) in the
5open market. Other BOT instruments inc1ude the discount and Lombard rate, the
statutory reserve requirements, moral inducement and gentlemen's agreements. The
characteristics of the various instruments are described in considerable detail in the
said web site (to which the interested reader is referred).
The interest rate
The interest rate is of specific concern to the present paper, given that it is a central
variable in the Keynesian transmission mechanism referred to earlier. The interest rate
(or rather: the average or typical interest rate) of Tanzanian is market oriented; it re-
flects the prevailing conditions in the financial market (i.e. the relative shortage or
surplus ofliquidity etc.) Even so, BOT plays a crucial role in "setting" the interest
rate; it is a major "force" behind the said market conditions. Thus, BOT determines
the "leading" (or "signal") interest-rates "underpinning" the financial market, it con-
trol the supply ofbase money etc.
The "signal" rates l are policy instruments in their own right. BOT describes them as
independent variables that it may use to control the supply of money (as defined in
terms ofM3), not as dependent variable controlled by it. This, however, does not im-
ply that BOT can impose them on the rest of the economy in the sense that it can set
them entirely at will and expect the market to "follow suite". In setting these rates
BOT has to take due account of other relevant factors and conditions, and of the over-
all policy objective of controlling inflation.
This may possibly have been different in earlier years. The financial sector was then
under heavy governent control, and credit allocated largely by administrative means
(rather than through the market). BOT was consequently in command of the financial
market. The governent, in its turn, was in command of BOT. At the same time, gov-
ernent budget discipline was weak, and governent "borrowing in the central bank"
the order of the day. BOT was consequently relied on to provide governent with a
steady supply of credits.
This scenario may possibly serve to throw some light upon a point raised in the earlier
cited CMI Report (R1998:5). It is recalled that the correlation coeffcient between
money supply and investments was found to be negative (-0.1), apparently to the SUf-
prise of the authors of the report. Instead, they appear to have expected a positive cor-
relation coeffcient on the assumption that:
. an increase in the money supply wil tend to lower the interest rate,
. which wil reduce the "cost ofborrowing",
. which wil increase the demand for investment products (because investments
tend to be credit financed).
A correlation coeffcient of -0.1 repudiates this hypothesis. It corresponds to a coeff-
cIent of determination of almost zero, indicating the absence of a causal relationship
of any kind between money supply and investments.2 This situation may possibly
arise because the first part of the above hypothesis is incorrect. In other words:
i The "signal" rates in question are the discount rate, which is used when BOT buys financia1 securities
from the banks, and the Lombard rate, which is used when BOT gives loans to the private banks.
2 See Appendix I for a note about the interpretation of the coeffcient of determnation, corre1ation co-
effcient etc.
6changes in money supply did not impact the interest rate, because both were set ad-
ministratively and independently.3
Monetary survey
Table Il, 1 portrays the various elements ofmoney supply in (mainland) Tanzania for
the period 1985-98. The rapid growth in the variables concemed is readily seen in the
upper section of the table. Thus, narrow money (Ml) grew by a factor of22, from 25
billion shilings in 1985 to 546 bilion in 1998. Broad money (M2) also grew by a
factor of 22, from 39 to 845 billion, while extended broad money (M3) grew by a
factor of 26, from 39 to 1,027 bilion. The additional growth in M3 is due to the
spectacular growth in foreign currency deposits, which has grown from virtually zero
in the 1980s, to 182 billon shilings in 1998.
Table IL 1 Monetary Survey for mainland Tanzania (TZS'Bilion)
Plus: Equa1s: P1us: Equa1s: P1us: Equa1s:
Currency Demand N arrow Time & Broad Foreign Extended
Year in circu1a- deposits money savmgs money currency broad
tion (Ml) deposits (M2) deposits money
(M3)
1985*) 12,7 12,6 25,3 13,7 38,9 0,2 39,0
1986 18,3 17,5 35,8 14,4 50,2 0,1 50,4
.. . .. . .. . . .. .. . .. . . .. .. .
1997 287,9 206,0 493,9 266,5 760,4 166,7 927,1
1998 307,8 237,7 545,5 299,4 844,9 182,1 1 027,0
Anual averages for se1ected periods:
1985-88 21,8 21,6 43,4 17,8 61,2 0,3 61,4
1989-93 76,0 76,4 152,5 74,7 227,2 16,3 243,4
1994-98 254,8 194,5 449,3 228,8 678,1 140,9 819,0
cont.
Extended of which:
broad Net Net c1aims Lending to Other
Year money foreign on gov- private & items,
(M3) assets emment parastatals net
1985*) 39,0 -10,8 32,3 17,4 -6,9
1986 50,4 -12,9 32,6 27,6 3,1
.. . .. . . .. .. . .. . .. .
1997 927,1 398,9 239,5 183,0 105,7
1998 1 027,0 458,0 276,6 248,3 44,1
Annua1 averages for se1ected periods:
1985-88 61,4 -16,7 38,0 43,4 -5,0
1989-93 243,4 15,9 82,2 177,1 -31,7
1994-98 819,0 285,9 254,4 220,1 58,5
.,)The 1985 entries do not balance.
Source: Tab1e Al of Annex IL.
3 Investment demand wil of course a1so depend on a number of other factors, besides the money sup-
p1y and the interest rate. Thus, it wil dep end on the "general investment climate", i.e. on such factors
as the situation with respect to "red tape", the secure supp1y ofrequired production inputs, the expecta-
tions about the future etc. Factors of this nature have probab1y been of considerable importance, espe-
cially in the past, given that the Tanzanian economy has suffered significant ineffciencies, inequilibria,
bott1enecks etc.
7Looking at the lower section of table Il, L we find that M3 was mainly associated with
lending to the private and parastatal sector, as well as with net c1aims on governent,
during the 1980s, and early 1990s. The prominence of these factors has weakened
considerably during the later 1990s, with foreign assets becoming the major M3 item
in recent years.
The rapid growth in the various money supply components is ilustrated in table I1,2.
The table shows that the foreign currency deposits increased at an average rate of 88
% pa during the period 1985-98, while extended broad money (M3) grew at an aver-
age rate of 29 % pa. The corresponding figure for Ml and M2 is 27 % pa (in both
cases). Breaking the 1985-98 period down into two sub-periods (1985-91 and 1992-
98) we find that the average growth rates were decidedly higher in the first sub-period
than in the second. This is the case for all the three money aggregates, and also for
their various sub-components, with the exception of foreign currency deposits.
Table IL2 Average growth ratesfor selected periods (geometric, % pa) *)
Currency Demand Narrow Time & Broad F oreign Ext. broad
in circu1a- deposits money savings money currency money
Period tion (Ml) deposits (M2) deposits (M3)
1985-88 36% 39% 37% 21 % 32% 24% 32%
1989-93 24% 25 % 25 % 30% 26% 105 % 29%
1994-98 20% 14% 17 % 20% 18 % 28% 20%
cont.
Extended of which:
broad Net N et c1aIms Lending to Other
Period money foreign on gov- private & items,
(M3) assets emment parastatals net
1985-88 32% 29% 17 % 62% 20%
1989-93 29% -204 % 25 % 18 % 5%
1994-98 20% 76% 8% 0% -204 %
*) Based on the data oftab1e AL.
Decomposing the overall growth rate
Table I1,3 shows the annual (year on year) growth rates for Ml, M2 and M3 during
each year of the period 1986-98. The growth rates are, as expected, seen to var with
respect to both years and variables. On the whole, however, the picture is one of fairly
substantial variations between years, and relatively modest variations within year. The
variation between years is particularly striking when comparing the rates of the last
few years to the rates of earlier years. In comparison, the variation between the three
variables (Ml, M2 and M3) within each year is relatively small. With some excep-
tions, the three aggregates seem to have moved fairly well in step over the years.
It is recalled that the question ofwhether to use M2 or M3 for the modelling effort
was raised in the Macmod report "Macroeconomic and budgetary modelling for me-
dium term planning (Phase Il)". The above observation may possibly serve to suggest
that the choice between the two is not all that important. 4
4 Note, however, that the above finding refers to annual data. A proper ana1ysis of the question ought
preferab1e to emp10y month1y data. According to present plans, this wil be done in another paper. We
wil therefore not venture further a10ng this road here.
8Table IL3 Annual growth ratesfor Ml, M2 and M3 (% pa)
Narrow Broad Ext. broad
Year money money money
(Ml) (M2) (M3)
1986 42% 29% 29%
1987 32 % 32 % 32%
1988 39 % 35% 35%
1989 26% 29% 29 %
1990 35 % 42% 43%
1991 22% 26% 27%
1992 37 % 38 % 43%
1993 33 % 29% 39%
1994 33 % 33 % 35%
1995 30 % 26% 32%
1996 5% 12 % 9%
1997 10 % 11 % 13 %
1998 10 % 11 % 11 %
Armua1 (geometric) averages, selected periods:
1985-88 37% 32 % 32%
1989-93 25 % 26% 29%
1994-98 17 % 18 % 20%
Table II,3 refers to the aggregate Ml, M2 and M3 leveis. It may be of some interest to
analyse how the various components of these aggregates have contributed to the over-
all growth in money supply. Table II,4 breaks the annual growth in the M3 aggregate
down into its various components.
The components oftable II,4 are additive within years, i.e. they add up to the M3-total
when summed row-wise. Section A presents the percentage shares of the annual (year
on year) growth in the value ofM3. Section B gives the same shares, but this time ex-
pressed in terms of the anual M3 (% pa) growth rate. Figures in bold (in section A)
are "local maxima" while the underlined figures are the corresponding minima.
Inspecting the table (section A) it is seen that curency in circulation, and lending to
the private and parastatal sector, were the main M3 components in the 1980s and
early 1990s. The picture, however, is not entirely "one-sided". Thus, in 1988 the de-
mand deposits contributed much more to the overall growth in M3 than did the cur-
rency in circulation.
Later years have seen considerable variations in this "pattem". All kinds of deposits,
including foreign currency deposits, have become important contributors to the
growth ofM3, as have net foreign assets. No single variable among them is however
able to dominate the picture in the way as currency in circulation and lending to the
private and parastatal sector dominated the picture in the early years.
All in all the picture presented by table II,4 is therefore one of significant change
during the 1990s, from an initial situation rather heavily dominated by the two factors:
currency in circulation and lending to the private and parastatal sector, to a situation
which is much more balanced in the sense that more factors have come into play.
9Table IL4 Components ofgrowth in M3 5
Section A: Percentage shares of the annual (year on year) growth in M3 value
Cur- Demand Narrow Time & Broad F oreign Extend. of which:
rency in deposits money savings money currency broad Net for- Net Lend- Other
Year circu1a- (Ml) deposits (M2) deposits money eign claIms ing to items,
tion (M3) assets on gov. priv.etc net
1986 49% 43 % 93 % 7% 99% -1 % 100 % -18 % 2% 89% 88%
1987 39% 31 % 70% 28% 99% 1 % 100% -44% 19 % 170 % -45 %
1988 31 % 48% 78% 21 % 100% 1 % 100% -14 % 69% 79% -34 %
1989 35% 29% 64% 32% 96% 4% 100% 5% 32% 126 % -62 %
1990 33% 24% 57 % 39% 96% 4% 100 % 57% -12 % 77% -22 %
1991 13 % 43 % 55 % 40% 95 % 5% 100 % 30% -32 % 117 % -16 %
1992 35% 20% 55 % 32% 88% 12 % 100% 31 % 37% -10 % 42%
1993 23 % 29% 52% 18 % 69% 31 % 100% -18 % 94% 48 % -24 %
1994 36% 19% 55 % 25 % 80% 20% 100 % 60 % -2 % 23 % 19 %
1995 37% 17% 54% 16% 69% 31 % 100 % 27% 54% -18 % 37%
1996 20% 12 % 32% 77% 109 % -9 % 100% 191 % 25 % -163 % 47%
1997 28% 13 % 41 % 28% 69% 31 % 100 % 100 % -52 % 38% 14%
1998 20% 32 % 52% 33 % 85 % 15 % 100% 59% 37% 65 % -62 %
Armua1 (geometric) averages for se1ected periods:
1985-88 37% 42% 79% 20% 99% 0% 100 % -25 % 38% 110 % -10 %
1989-93 27% 28% 55 % 29% 84% 16% 100% 15 % 40% 52 % -7%
1994-98 31 % 19 % 49% 30% 79% 21 % 100% 71 % 15 % 0% 13 %
S B S b b d f h Yi 3 hection ame as a ove, ut express e II terms o t e o o pa M growt rates
Cur- Demand Narrow Time & Broad F oreign Extend. of which:
rency in deposits money savings money currency broad Net for- Net Lend- Other
Year circu1a- (Ml) deposits (M2) deposits money eign claIms ing to items,
tion (M3) assets on gov. I priv. etc net
1986 14 % 13 % 27% 2% 29% 0% 29% -5 % 1 % 26% 26%
1987 12 % 10 % 22% 9% 32% 0% 32% -14 % 6% 54% -14 %
1988 11 % 17 % 27% 7% 35 % 0% 35 % -5 % 24% 28 % -12 %
1989 10% 8% 19 % 9% 28% 1 % 29% 1 % 9% 37% -18 %
1990 14% 10% 25 % 17 % 42 % 2% 43 % 24% -5 % 33 % -9 %
1991 3% 11 % 15 % 11 % 26% 1 % 27% 8% -9% 32 % -4%
1992 15 % 9% 24% 14 % 37% 5% 43 % 13 % 16% -4 % 18 %
1993 9% 11 % 20% 7% 27% 12 % 39% -7 % 37 % 19 % -9 %
1994 13 % 7% 20% 9% 28% 7% 35 % 21 % -1 % 8% 7%
1995 12% 5% 17 % 5% 22% 10% 32% 9% 17 % -6 % 12 %
1996 2% 1 % 3% 7% 9% -1 % 9% 17 % 2% -14 % 4%
1997 4% 2% 5% 4% 9% 4% 13 % 13 % -7 % 5% 2%
1998 2% 3% 6% 4% 9% 2% 11 % 6% 4% 7% -7 %
Armua1 (geometric) averages for selected periods:
1985-88 36% 39% 37% 21 % 32% 24% 32% 29% 17 % 62 % 20%
1989-93 24% 25 % 25 % 30% 26% 105 % 29% -204 % 25 % 18 % 5%
1994-98 20% 14 % 17 % 20% 18 % 28 % 20% 76% 8% 0% -204 %
5 Note that the various components are directly additive. Thus, for each year they add up to the M3
growth rate.
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III : Transmission mechanisms
Implicit assumptions
The assignment drawn up in the introduction may at first glanee seem clear enough.
On closer consideration, however, the picture becomes less lueid. This is because the
assignment implicitly builds upon certain underlying presumption about the nature of
the Tanzanian economy. These presumptions are of fundamental importanee to the
question put before us, and they seem far from self-evident to the present author. We
shall therefore take a closer look at them.
The texts cited in chapter I seem to have accepted without much qualm that monetary
policy has so far been "most effective" in influencing local demand, and hence local
production. Splitting this argument into its separate components, we get the following
two statements:
. Typically speaking, the economy of Tanzania is (or, rather: has been) demand-
driven (as opposed to supply-driven).
. The use ofmonetary variables is (or, rather: has been) the most effective way
of controlling aggregate demand.
The first ofthese statements implies that demand is the critical factor determining the
volume of activity attained by the country's producers. Supply, on the other hand, is
assumed merely to "follow" demand. Producers are consequently presumed able,
wiling and compelled to meet any variations in demand for their products. Given
such a structure, slow economic growth may be seen as caused by weak aggregate
demand, not by supply-side constraints or similar. In order to achieve higher eco-
nomic growth one must therefore try to increase dem and, rather than production ca-
pacity.
Assumptions of this nature is often adopted in the case of rich, industrialised coun-
tries, especially for the short-term perspective, or when faced with an economic
downturn or depression.6 The assumption seems more doubtful in the case of a poor,
agricultural country like Tanzania, where significant supply constraints in all prob-
ability are the order ofthe day.
Expressing this differently we may note that the fundamental problem of countries
like Tanzania is poverty. The predicament is therefore not one of insufficient demand
as such, in the sense that consurners etc are "holding back" and have to be stimulated
so as to spend more. Rather, it is one of insuffcient income and purehasing power,
allowing them to satisfy their many unsatisfied needs. The insuffcient income, in its
turn, reflects insufficient means ofproduction, insufficient labour productivity etc.,
i.e. insuffcient capacity to produee and supply.
The second of the above statements (about total demand being governed mainly by
the money supply) also seems a bit doubtfuL. In order to discuss this statement we
draw on the macro budget identity which equates total demand to total supply, and
6 Le. when affected by a slow or otherwise unsatisfactory economic performance, despite spare pro-
duction capacity.
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bre aks both down into their various components. Thus: Total Supply, which is equal
to: GDP + Imports, must be equal to Total Demand, which is equal to: Private and
Governent Consumption + Private and Governent Capital Formation + Exports +
Changes in Inventories.
It is readily seen that one of the above demand variables (exports) represents foreign-
ers' procurement of Tanzanian products. Such demand seems likely to dep end on
conditions abroad, and equally unlikely to depend on the monetary situation in Tan-
zania.7
Among the local dem and components private consumption accounts for the lion's
share of all demand. Thus, as seen from table 111,1 it accounts for around 6/10 of total
demand, some 3-4 times the share of the next largest demand components (govern-
ment consumption and private investments).
Table IlL 1: The macro budget 8
Supply Demand
components Total components Errors
GDP at supply Private Gov. Private Gov. Change and
Year market Imports (& de- con- con- invest- invest- Ex- II omis-
pnce mand) sumpt. sumpt. ments ments ports stocks sions
A : Absolute values, at constant 1992 prices, TZS 'billion
1987 1 154 481 1635 952 229 302 23 120 3 6
1988 1201 477 1678 987 250 230 21 131 3 56
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
1996 1525 561 2086 1278 169 264 10 329 4 32
1997 1578 403 1 981 1 310 135 252 23 247 4 10
B : Percentage distribution
1987 71 % 29% 100 % 58 % 14% 18 % 1 % 7% 0% 0%
1988 72% 28 % 100 % 59% 15 % 14% 1 % 8% 0% 3 %
i
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
1996 73 % 27% 100% 61 % 8% 13 % 0% 16 % 0% 2%
1997 80% 20% 100 % 66% 7% 13 % 1 % 12% 0% 0%
Private consumption may possibly be affected by monetary variables, for instance via
the credit market, via the inflation rate or simI1ar. On the whole, however, these im-
pacts are likely to be indirect and marginal in nature. This is especially so given the
fact that a large part of private consumption is non-monetary in nature. Thus, as table
A3 of Anex Il demonstrates, a large part of Tanzania's GDP is of the non-monetar
kind. Almost all ofthis ends up as private consumption.9
What then, is the decisive factor behind private consumption demand? The obvious
answer to this question is that consumer demand is "driven" by consumer income.
7 Note that this statement concems the demand side of exports. It does not ru1e out the possibility that
the supply of exports may be influenced by 10ca1 monetary variab1es, either in terms ofvolume or price.
8 From tab1e A5 of Armex IL.
9 A mIor part ofnon-monetary GDP is usually ascribed to private investments (hut constrction etc).
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Consumption incurs expenditure, which the consumer has to cover. The necessary
"consumer purehasing power" is largely acquired through "inc om es earned" (as modi-
fied by assets held, taxes paid, savings (positive or negative) made, gifts/transfers
given or received etc).
The incornes in question are primarily those earned as labour rewards (inc1usive of
incomes-in-kind, incomes from self-employment, "incomes" in non-monetary activity
etc.), but capital returns in small and medium scale activities are probably also of
relevance. Given that returs to labour and capital are the major components ofGDP,
"incomes earned" are therefore c10sely associated with the latter, which may serve as
a "shadow variable" for the former.
The case of private investments provides more scope for the monetary dimension, at
least in principle. Like consumption, investments have to be financed. This will often
be from the investors' own assets or incomes, but credit finanee is also common (pro-
vided that the country in question has the required credit facilities). The average pri-
vate investment project may therefore be dependent upon the credit market, which in
its turn presumably reflect monetary and credit policies. Investment decisions, how-
ever, reflect many and complex factors, not merely the "ease or squeeze" in the credit
market. Investments may therefore be low even though credit conditions seem favour-
able (and vice versa), denying the effective role ofmoney and credit also for this var-
able.IO
Governent demand (consumption and investments) ought in principle to be financed
by governent incomes (tax revenues, grants etc.), by drawing on existing assets, or
by borrowing from the non-governent sector. In other words, the resources us ed by
governent ought to be "balaneed" against a paralleI reduction in the "disposable re-
sources" of the rest of the economy.
However, governents are often inclined to spend "beyond their means", "borrowing
in the central bank" to cover the extra expenditures. In most cases this is a euphemism
for "printing money", i.e. for injecting additional money into the economy. So also in
Tanzania, where poor budget discipline and extensive deficit spending used to be a
common occurrence in governent organisations. In this particular sense, therefore,
money supply and governent demand went hand in hand.
This, however, was no receipt for economic development. The result of such mone-
tary expansion was all to of ten found to be demand pressure and inflation, rather than
real-term economic growth.ll In recognition ofthis fact, the Tanzanian authorities
have curtaI1ed the use of such deficit financing in recent years. The c10se relationship
between money supply and governent demand described above is therefore unlikely
to persist today.
Summing up, there consequently seems quite limited scope for a direct monetary im-
pact on economic demand categories. This, however, is not to deny the possibility that
10 Thus, it is recalled from the earlier quoted CMI Report (R1998:5) that the investments were found to
be negatively correlated to the money supp1y.11 Note, however, that a certaIn degree ofmonetary expansion, reflecting (and "servicing") the growth
of the (monetary) economy, may neverteless be required as part of proper macro-economic manage-
ment.
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demand may be indirectly linked to money supply via production, i.e. via the supply
variable: GDP. Thus, it is recalled that private consumption, which constitutes the
lion's share of demand, is c10sely associated with GDP. In the following chapter we
shalllook at the relationship between production and money supply.
Aggregate money and production
It is recalled from CMI Report RI998:5) that the Tanzanian correlation coefficient for
money supply and production was found to be "exceptionally high", sugge sting a
strong bond between these two varables. However, as explained in Anex I, the COf-
relation coeffcient in itself is but a measure of statistical association; it does not im-
ply any form of causality between the variables concemed.
Rectifying this "deficiency", by formulating a feasible hypothesis of causality, how-
ever, may seem a fairly straightforward matter in the present case. Thus, we may for
instance put forward the hypothesis implied in the said CMI Report, i.e. that produc-
tion is a function ofthe money supply. Spelling this out in further detail, we hypothe-
sise that the leve! of total GDP (as measured in real terms, i.e. constant prices) in any
given year may be treated as a linear fuction of the corresponding (nominal) level of
the monetary aggregate M2 in the same year.
Putting this hypothesis to the test, by running the available data through a simple re-
gression analysis, we get a coefficient of determination of 0.85, implying that 85% of
the varation in the dependent variable (GDP) is caused by the variation in the inde-
pendent variable (M2). This may at first glance appear to constitute conc1usive evi-
dence of causality. After all, how could such a high coeffcient of determination pos-
sibly mirror anything but a fairly c1ear and strong causallink between these variables?
To answer this question we simply need to take note of the obvious. The problem of
creating economic growth would be easily overcome if mere increases in the money
supply were capable of inducing the kind of production respons es suggested above. If
this had been the case, why bother with other economic growth factors than the
money supply, and why not use it more expansionary, in the safe knowledge that the
result is stronger economic growth? The answer, of course, is that experience has
shown that monetary variables can produce little economic growth in and by them-
selves; flushing the economy with money is likely to result in inflation rather than in
real term economic growth.
The idea that the authorities can use the money supply to "drive" the economic
growth process on a simple "pro-rata" basis is consequently untenable. And yet that is
what our regression results seem to imply. This suggests that the relationship between
these variables is spurious, despite the high coeffcient of determination. This problem
may for instance have arisen because the relationship is incorrectly specified in re-
spect of the problem studied.
To investigate this possibility we take a c10ser look at the data yielding the 0.85 co ef-
ficient of determination. Table 111,3 contains the data in question, as well as their im-
plied % pa growth rates. It is noted that the 0.85 coeffcient refers to the specific "total
dimension" of the variables analysed (see Section A of the table), and that this is not
the only "dimension" possible (see, for instance, Section B of the table).
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We consequently need to ask ourselves if our use of the "total dimension" represents
an appropriate choice. In other words: should the presumed relationship between
rnoney and production variables really be defined in terms of the absolute GDP- and
M2-levels? Isn't it more appropriate to define it as a relationship between the changes
in these leveIs?
Table: IIL3: Aggregate Money and Production, 1986-9712
Section A Section B
Abso1ute values (TZS'billon) Puual increases (~pa)
Year Aggregate Production Aggregate Production
Money (M2) (Total GDP) Monev (M2) (Total GDP)
1986 50 1001 NA NA
1987 66 1072 31.7~ 7.0~
1988 89 1119 35.1 ~ 4.4~
1989 115 1 148 28.5 ~ 2.6~
1990 163 1219 42.1 ~ 6.2 ~
1991 206 1253 26.1 ~ 2.8~
1992 285 1276 38.5 ~ 1.8 ~
1993 367 1 281 28.8 ~ 0.4~
1994 486 1299 32.5 ~ 1.4 ~
1995 614 1345 26.1 ~ 3.6~
1996 685 1402 11.6 ~ 4.2 ~
1997 760 1448 11.0 ~ 3.3 ~
In sugge sting the existence of a causallink between M2 and GDP, we undoubtedly
mean to irnply that the absolute aggregate GDP-values sornehow reflect the corre-
sponding aggregate M2-values. But that does not tell the whole story; in addition, we
mean to imply that this correlation at the aggregate level has arisen because given
changes in M2 give rise to corresponding changes in GDP.
We may "test" the validity of the latter postulate by reformulating our regression hy-
pothesis in terms of the annual changes in the two variables in question. Table III,4
summarises the result of alternative postulates. Section A of the tab le confirms that
the coeffcient of determination between the absolute levels is 0.85 (for the variables
TotGDP and M2). Section B shows that a reformulation of the hypothesis in terms of
the absolute annual changes of the variables (i.e. in terms of dTotGDP and dM2)
yields a coeffcient of determination ofno more than 0.07. Finally, section C shows
that a reformulation of the hypothesis in terms of the relative annual changes of the
variables (i.e. in terms of d~TotGDP and d~M2) yields a coeffcient of determina-
tion as low as -0.10 (which we may interpret as 0.00).
In both of the latter cases, therefore, the coefficient of determination implies that the
variables involved grew independently of one another, even though they appear to
have followed each other fairly c10sely at the "accumulated" leveL. The table also
shows that this apparent paradox is not unique to the specific variables here discussed
12 The monetary aggregate in question is: M2, and the aDP aggregate: total aDP at factor cost, in con-
stant 1992 prices.
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(TotGDP & M2 etc). It is equally the case for other specifications of the monetary and
production variables. No matter which of the monetary variables we pick, and which
ofthe production variables, the picture is the same: a very high coefficient of deter-
mination wrt to the absolute leve! of the variables, and a very low wrt the increase in
this leveL. 13
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C : Adjusted R square wrt relative increase (in annual money and
roduction volumes 16. Unit ofmeasurement: % a.
Inde endent variable: d%M1t d%M2t d%M3t
De endent varable:d%TotGDPt -0.11 * -0.10* -0.10*d%MonGDPt -0.11 * -0.09* -0.10*d%NmonGDPt -0.10* -0.09* -0.10*
*) Note that the va1ue of the Adjusted R Square may turn out negative. These may be interpreted in the
same way as regu1ar zero va1ues, i.e. as evidence of non-association between the variables in question.
It is recalled from the document: "Macroeconomic and budgetary modellng for me-
dium term planing (Phase Il)" that: "it wil be explored whether using M3 as the
monetary aggregate improves the model projections". It follows from the above result
that no significant advantage is to be gained by choosing M3 (or any other monetary
aggregates), as long as we focus on the direct relationship between money and pro-
duetion. Thus, a feasible interpretation of the results of table III,4 may be to deny the
existence of an "operational" relationship between these varables, implying that the
13 Tab1e III,4 reveals a somewhat odd point conceming monetary and non-monetary GDP. Inspecting
section A of the tab1e it is seen that the coefficient of determination (between money and GDP) is
higher in the case ofnon-monetary GDP than in the case ofmonetary GDP. Inspecting section B of the
table, moreover, the situation is seen to be just the opposite in terms ofincreases in these variab1es.
14 Le. alternative combinations of aggregate money supp1y and aggregate production. The latter is
measured by GDP at factor cost at constant 1992 prices (for the period 1986-97).
15 Thus: dM1i = M1t_1 - MIt, and simI1ar for the other variab1es.
16 Thus: d%M1i = (Mlt_i - MIt) / MIt. and sim1ar for the other variab1es.
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authorities can not rely on given changes in monetary aggregates to induce given
GDP reactions.
Admittedly, this negative conclusion may reflect shortcomings in our analysis or hy-
pothesis. Thus, we have used a simple regress ion technique to calculate the above co-
efficients, assuming simple 1inearity between the dependent and independent vari-
ables. We have a1so disallowed any possible time-lags between the variables. The
latter may well be important; it seems reasonable to expect the monetary impact on
production to materialise gradually and after a certain time-lag, rather than immedi-
ately.
A proper lag-analysis would require the use ofmonthly or quarterly data. Such data
exist for the monetary aggregates, but not for GDP. We are consequently not in a po-
sition to undertake such an assignment. A number of crude lag-analyses, introducing
alternative lag periods, have nevertheless been made, based on the annual data at
hand. The result of this exercise was negative; none of the lag alternatives attempted
gave any indication whatsoever of causality between money (M2) and production
(GDP). 17
Admittedly, this conclusion refers to a few simple lag-alternatives only. Our analysis
is far from exhaustive; there are numerous other lag structures and relationships that
we could have analysed in our quest for the "truth" about the relation between money
and produetion. We shall not try to do so; in all probability this would only involve us
in an "endless" exercise, which would be unlikely to succeed in "proving or disprov-
ing" the existence of a certain relationship between money and production.
Instead we shalliook at the issue from "the other end", and demonstrate that it is in-
deed quite possible for a set of non-correlated growth impuls es to produee trends that
are highly correlated. To do so we construet aset ofhypothetical cases, in which we a
priori ensure that the annual changes in GDP and M2 are umelated. We do so simply
by substituting the actual % pa increases in GDP and M2 (given in table IlI,3) by aset
of randomly chosen growth-rates.
In order to keep the ca1culation example reasonably close to the actual case investi-
gated, however, we de fine the feasible range ofvariation for the two varables. Thus,
the annual percentage changes in GDP and M2 are allowed to vary freely in all re-
spects, but only within broad ranges suggested by the data oftable IIl,3. Inspecting
these data we find that the ranges in question are 0-7 %pa for GDP and 11-42 %pa
for M2.
Twenty alternative data sets were put through the same regression analysis as used for
the actual data. The results ofthis exercise are given in table IlI,5. Column A of the
tab le gives the coeffcient of determination for the regression between the % pa trend
17 Alternative 1ag-periods between 1 and 18 months were used. The GDP-variab1e (d%TotGDPt or
d%MonGDPt) was dermed as a linear function of the lag-variable LM2i. The latter was defined as a
function of the d%M2i variab1es, calcu1ated as the following weighted average: LM2i = (mCl)*d%M2t-1
+ IlO) *d%M2i) / (Il-I) + IlO))' where: Ilr) was the number of months for year: t-r applicable to the av-
erage. The sum: Il-I) + IlO) was kept equa1 to 12 throughout the present ana1ysis. (NB: In the formula
used for lags exceeding 12 months the lag-variable LM2i was calcu1ated as: (Il-i)*d%M2i-i + Il-
1)*d%M2t-i )/12, where: mp) + Il-I) = 12.)
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inereases. Given that these data are all random1y generated we shou1d expeet them to
be non-eorre1ated, i.e. we wou1d expeet the eoeffeient of determination to be zero (or
very c10se to zero). Most of the results given in eo1umn A are ofthis nature. However,
eo1umn A a1so demonstrates that the eoeffeient of determination for random1y gener-
ated data may oeeasionally beeome quite substantial. This refleets the faet that eaeh of
our samp1es eontain rather few observations. In sueh small samp1es even eompletely
randomly generated data may oeeasionally turn out in such away that they appear to
be eorre1ated.
Table IlL 5: Results ofrandom data calculations 18
Coeffieient of determination for:
A : Regression B : Regression
between %pa between absolute





















Lowest result -0,11 0,71
Highest result 0,44 0,99
Average result 0,05 0,90
Column B of tab le 111,5 gives the eoeffieient of determination for the regression be-
tween the absolute trend leveIs, i.e. between the total aeeumulated values eorre-
sponding to the % pa inereases analysed ineolumn A. Despite their randomly gener-
ated origin, these trends are all seen to have very high coeffeients of determination.
Thus, the eoeffieient vares be1ween 0.71 and 0.99 within the sample. The average
eoeffeient is 0.90, signifieantly higher than the 0.85 ealeulated for our aetual data set.
is Results of the regression ana1ysis oftwenty different data sets. Each data set contains 11 subsets of
data. These represent the % pa increase and the corresponding total va1ue, of two different variab1es
(for instanee GDP and M2). All the % pa increases have been randomly chose (within broad limits).
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We have consequently demonstrated that non-correlated growth impulses may pro-
duce highly correlated trends at the aggregate level. The underlying factor producing
this apparent paradox may be described as "trend behaviour". There wil often be a
tendency for variables to be statistically correlated at the aggregate leve! ifthey show
such behaviour, implying that each ofthem tends to mo ve relatively steadily in a
given direction.
Hence, ifthis is the case, the variables do not ne ed to mo ve "in perfect harmony", or
in the same direction, to produce statistically correlated trends at the aggregate level.
Economic variables like money supply, commodity prices and production wil often
exhibit such "trend behaviour". On the whole, they all tend to grow over time, al-
though at very different rates. Such "conformity of movement" may of course reflect
that the variables in question are after alllinked to each other, although not directly
and simply. Thus, they may for instance of ten tur out to be linked indirectly through
yet other (underlying) factors. Such indirect relationships, however, are beyond our
present simple regress ion analysis.
Money supply and inflation
In the above chapter we rejected the idea of a simple, powerful and direct relationship
between money supply and economic growth. This, however, does not mean that
money supply is irrelevant to economic progress. On the contrary, proper manage-
ment of the money supply is an important condition for economic development. But it
is not alone in being so; other measures are also vitaL. These, however, ne ed to be
supported by appropriate monetary measures in their turn.
The most direct and obvious relevance of the money supply variables concerns the
area of inflation. Other things being equal, rapid growth in the overall money supply
may be expected to fuel inflation, while slow growth in the money supply may serve
to hold inflation in check. This wil in its turn have implications for the production
side of the economy. Thus, the rate ofinflation may harm the economic development
prospects of the nation ifit is too high.19
This, as we have already seen, is also the view of the monetary authorities of Tanza-
nia. Thus, it is recalled from above that the Bank of Tanzania has made it quite c1ear
in its web site (www.bot-tz.org) that:
. Price stability is the primary objective of the Bank.
. BOT employs the money supply principally to control inflation.
. Inflation control, however, is not an end in itself, but the means by which mone-
tary policy is expected to contribute to economic growth.
. In other words: low inflation is expected to allow the economy to function more
effectively, thereby contributing to better economic performance over time.
In order to study the relationship between money and price varables we have calcu-
lated regression results parallel to those presented in the preceding chapter. The re-
sults are reported in table III,6. A notable degree of accord is seen to exist between
money supply and inflation. The accord is extremely strong at the absolute leve! (see
19 Arguab1y, the rate of inflation may a1so hann the economic deve10pment prospects of the nation if it
is too 10w, for instance negative.
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Section A), with coefficients of determination very dose to 1.00. As explained in the
previous chapter, however, this does not necessarily prove causality. It may, at least in
theory, merely imply that the two variables in question both show "typical trend be-
haviour" .
In order to analyse causality we should therefore focus on the changes in these trends.
Sections B and C of tab le 111,6 contain the coefficients of determination obtained from
analysing the annual absolute and relative changes. It is readily apparent that these
results are quite different from those ca1culated in the previous chapter. Thus, the pre-
sent coeffcients of determination go as high as 0.72 for the absolute changes, and as
high as 0.58 for the relative ones, indicating a significant degree of causality between
the variables in question.
Table IIL6 Coeffcient of determination (adjusted R square) for alternative data com-
binations wrt aggregate money supply and inflation 20
A : Adiusted R square wrt absolute level
Independent variable: MIt M2t M3t
Dependent variable: The absolute value of the price index for:
:Total GDP (PTGDPt) 0,98 0,99 0,99
:Monetary GDP (PMGDPt) 0,98 0,99 0,99
:Non-Mon. GDP (PNGDPt) 0,96 0,97 0,97
B : Adiusted R square wrt absolute annua L increasil
Independent variable: dM1t dM2t dM3t
Dependent variable: The absolute increase in the price index for:
:Total GDP (dPTGDPt) 0,39 0,63 0,61
:Monetary GDP (dPMGDPt) 0,50 0,71 0,72
:Non-Mon. GDP (dPNGDPD 0,17 0,42 0,37
C : Adjusted R square wrt relative annual increase22
Independent variable: d%M1t d%M2t d%M3t
Dependent variable: The relative increase in the price index for:
:Total GDP (d%PTGDPt) 0,31 0,12 0,07
:Monetary GDP (d%PMGDPt) 0,58 0,35 0,30
:Non-Mon. GDP (d%PNGDPt) 0,00 -O 08') -O 10*), ,
*) Note that the va1ue of the Adjusted R Square may turn out negative. These may be interpreted in the
same way as regu1ar zero va1ues, i.e. as evidence of non-association between the variab1es in question.
This description, however, does not apply to all altematives. The two coefficients
cited above represent the absolute maxima oftable 111,6. The corresponding minima
go as low as 0.17 and -0.10 respectively. This is comparable to the coeffcients found
wrt GDP (see previous chapter). It is recalled that we conduded that no causality was
indicated in that case. The results of table 111,6 may therefore appear to be somewhat
conflicting, indicating both the presence and absence of causality.
20 Inflation is measured by the GDP price deflator oftab1e II,6.
2\ dMli = M11_1 - MIi, and sim1ar for the other variab1es.
22 d%M1t = (M1t_1 - MIt) / MIt, and simi1ar for the other variables.
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This is easily explained by the fact that the economy of Tanzania is both monetary
and non-monetary in character. The difference between the two is easily seen in tab le
III,6. The low coefficients of determination relate to the price movements ofnon-
monetary production, while the high coefficients relate to the price movements of
monetary production. The medium size coeffcients relate to the price movements of
their aggregate (i.e. of total monetary and non-monetary production).
This corresponds to what one would a priori expect. The close relationship between
money and price movements will presumably apply primarily for products that are
traded at market price. The imputed accounting prices used to value non-monetary
production fall into a different category (as do governent regulated prices). They
should not be expected to exhibit the same relationship to the monetary variables as
the market prices, even when they are said to reflect general trends in market prices.
The coefficients of determination given in table III,6 all refer to a rather crude under-
lying hypothesis implying that the inflation experienced in a given year is treated as a
simple linear function of the money supply in that same year. Thus, it is presumed
that varations in money supply are directly and immediately translated into corre-
sponding variations in inflation. This is unlikely to be the case. In reallife, changes in
the money supply are likely to translate into price variations only gradually and over
time.
Lag analyses, based on monthly or quarterly price and money data, are required to
examine the "translation process" involved properly. Monthly data for monetary ag-
gregates and inflation trends are available for Tanzania23. Time constraint does how-
ever not allow us to undertake such an analysis as part of the present paper. 24 Instead
we merely reiterate that we have obtained rather convincing results from our analysis
even without introducing any kind of lags or refinements. The introduction of such
features ought (logically) to improve the results furher (provided that the relevant
features can be identified).
We next turn to the question of the "best" monetary variable for policy modelling
purposes. Other things being equal, the "choice" variable should obviously be the
monetary aggregate with the strongest link to the inflation rate (and hence indirectly
to the rate of GDP growth).
Before proceeding we take note of the official view. BOT's opinion about inflation
control is given in the earlier cited web site, where the Bank states that:
23 The data on inflation, however, refer to the consurner price index, rather than to the tye of "all-
embracing" GDP deflator used in the present ana1ysis.
24 A quick and crude lag ana1ysis, covering the variables d%Ml and d%PMGDP (both ofwhich are
defined in table II,6), was in fact undertaken. It was however not based on month1y data, but on the
armua1 data presented in this paper. The ana1ysis was similar in form to that undertaken for money and
production in the previous chapter. It produced no significant improvements in the coefficient of de-
termation, but it did indicate that the said "translation proeess" may possib1y drag on for as much as
half a year or more.
The issue obvious1y calls for a proper investigation, based on monthly data, and allowing for a range
of alternative 1ag-strctures. An in-dept examine of this natue, however, taking into consideration the
many potentia1 possibilities of non-linear re1ationships, multi-period lag strctures etc, may prove quite
a large job.
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. BOT controls inflation by controlling the money supply. In so doing, BOT targets
M3 (extended broad money), that it regards as the monetary aggregate with the
c10sest relationship to the inflation rate.
. To influence the targeted M3 aggregate, however, the BOT normally controls the
base money (reserve money, or central ban money) which is directly related to
money supply.
BOT consequently regards M3 as the monetary aggregate with the c10sest relationship
to the inflation rate. Inspecting table 111,6, however, we find scant support for this
view. True, the table does provide some slight support for the BOT view, but in the
main it presents a different picture.
Focusing on the relationship between the alternative money supply variables and the
price ofmonetary GDP prices we find that M3 does indeed have the highest coeffi-
cient of determination when the variables are measured in terms of absolute annual
changes (see section B). Even so, however, M2 do es have almost as high a coeffcient
as M3, only that of Ml is significantly lower.
Section C of the table, however, indicates that Ml is far superior to the other two
variables when they are measured in terms of relative annual changes (% pa). This is
the data-format most commonly employed for expressing changes in the variables
concerned. It consequently seems that our results contradict the BOT stance in this
matter. 25
Inflation and economic growth
In the above chapter we noted that there is an upper limit to how quickly the money
supply should be allowed to grow. Exceeding this limit wil hurt the prospects for
economic development. There is also a limit to how slow the money supply ought to
grow. Both an insuffcient and an excessive supply ofmoney wil be detrimental to
the economy concerned, harming the prospects of real term growth derived from in-
vestments etc. An appropriate supply ofmoney, on the other hand, may allow the in-
vestments etc to bear frits. The role ofmoney in the economy may therefore be com-
pared to that of a lubricant in an engine. The lubricant is essential to the smooth run-
ning of the engine, yet it can not drive the engine on its own.26
Thus, the prospects for economic growth may be at risk if the rate of inflation be-
comes "too high". High inflation may give rise to sub-optimal saving and investment
behaviour. Such inflation may for instance encourage immediate consumption at the
cost of saving for the future. The utilisation of funds saved may also change; invest-
25 It shou1d be noted, however, that the inflation concept used by BOT is somewhat different from the
one used above. Thus, BOT refers to a price index for certain types of consumption, rather than the
overall GDP price index. BOT measures inflation by the non-food sub-index of the National Consumer
Price Index (NCPI). The GDP price index, covering the who1e range of (monetary) production in Tan-
zania (but ignoring fina1-use imports) might arguab1y have been a better measure of overall 10cal infla-
tion. Even if this shou1d be the case, however, the GDP index represents no practica1 option for the
bank. The NPCI has to be emp10yed because it alone provides the bank with up-to-date estimates on a
month1y basis. The food component is exc1uded because food prices are very sensitive to factors totally
ume1ated to the money supply (tyically: weather conditions).
26 Translating this into more technica1 terms we may say that appropriate monetary policies represent
necessary but insuffcient conditions for economIc development.
22
ment "portfolios" are likely to become "biased" towards the more "inflation-safe" al-
ternatives, rather than towards the more productive ones. This reflect a tendency for
resource allocation in general to become sub-optimal, as economic actors try to pro-
tect their incomes and assets from inflation-Iosses, as opposed to employing them to
maximum effect in the wider macro-economic perspective.
The prospects for economic growth may also be at risk if the rate of inflation is "too
low", for instance negative. This is because the real-term value of existing debts are
affected by inflation, unless their nominal value is adjusted in step with the inflation
rate, something that is seldom the case. A negative rate of inflation will consequently
tend to lead to an increase in the real value of existing debts and loans. This is impor-
tant because the average producer wil typically be a credit user; i.e. he will typically
have borrowed money to financed at least some ofhis past investments etc, and he has
typically done so at interest rates reflecting expectations of positive inflation. Such a
producer may be hard hit by a spell of deflation.27
Commentators on the topic of economic policy often seem to regard zero inflation as
something of an ideaL. This may be understandable given recent economic history.
Following years ofrapid inflation during the 1970s and 1980s, the fight against infla-
tion was put high on the political agenda. Economic policy makers, especially in the
industrialised countries, turned their attention decisively to the fight against inflation.
The fight was to most intents and purposes won already some years ago, but even so,
the rhetoric and fear of inflation may linger on.
Looking at the economic development record over a longer period and a broader span,
however, the picture may possibly turn out a little different. Economic growth and
inflation have tended to be "fellow travellers"; periods of economic growth have often
a1so been periods of (positive) inflation. This may be explained as a concrete expres-
sion of the tendency for the economic growth process to create its own inflationary
pressures.
Fighting back these pressures completely may require harsh remedies, which may
jeopardise the growth itself. Besides, it may be argued that a mild degree ofinflation,
for instance around 3-4 % pa, may in fact be beneficial for a country's overall growth
prospects. Hence, drawing on the arguments used above, it may be noted that a mild
dose ofinflation willlighten real-term debt burdens28, while at the same time it may
be hoped that the tendency towards sub-optimal resource allocation is kept to a mini-
mum. If so, a certain (mild) degree of inflation may consequently be seen to "oil the
wheels of economic growth".
It may seem that the BOT shares this view. Thus, it is recalled from above that BOT
is responsible for "ensuring monetary conditions that are consistent with low and sta-
ble inflation", and that "low inflation allows the economy to function more effec-
tively, thereby contributing to better economic performance over time." In other
words, the bank tries to promote economic development, not by eradicating inflation,
but by keeping it reasonably IOW and predictable.
27 Deflation (negative inflation) is of ten associated with periods of economIc crisis, both because the
crisis may 1ead to deflation, and because the latter may serve to strengthen the crisis.
28 Le. it wil have the same effect as a reduction in the interest rate, which (ceteris paribus) may be ex-
pected to "fue1 the economy", though increase borrowing, investments etc.
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iv : Model structures
General format
Summing up the findings of the above chapters we may conclude that the relationship
between money supply and production is neither direct nor simple in nature. The
money supply does not impact production directly, but via inflation. Other things be-
ing equal, we may consequently expect money supply to influence inflation, and in-
flation to affect production.
Focusing on the latter relationship, it appears that a favourable rate ofinflation is a
necessary condition for economic growth. It is not, however, a suffcient condition for
such growth. In other words: inflation can not create economic progress in and by it-
self, but it can help or harm the prospects for such progress.
A favourable rate of inflation is synonymous with areasonably low and predictable
rate. Inflation should not be allowed to "skyrocket", but neither should it be allowed
to "drop through the floor". Most countries, however, are seldom at any risk of expe-
rieneing the latter.
When "translating" these conclusions into concrete mathematical model-structures it
is evident that the relationship between money supply and economic growth should
not be portrayed as a simple and linear one. Instead, we may ne ed to break it down
into the two separate relationships described above, i.e. one portraying the relation-
ship between money supply and inflation, and another portraying the relationship
between inflation and production.
The first of these relationships may possibly be portrayed using some kind of simple
near-linear type of (absolute or logarithmic) formula, in which given variations in
money supply are assumed to impact the inflation rate in given ways, and after given
time lags. This may suffce, (provided that the degree of sophistication aimed at in the
model is not too high), given that the coeffcient of determination between these vari-
ables is relatively high.29
The second relationship may ne ed to be treated with more circumstance. The relation-
ship between inflation and economic growth ought not to be portrayed by way of a
simple and linear function, according to which x % of inflation may be relied on to
produee y % of GDP "no matter what". Inflation, after all, is only one among several
GDP-driving factors (and in many cases it may not even be the most important one).
Inflation should therefore be seen as a determinant for production, but in no way as
the only or main one.
Moreover, linearity does not apply even when focusing on the relationship between
inflation and production in a specific and parial sense. The relation between the two
should ideally be expressed as some kind ofinverted U-form or similar, reflecting the
29 In a more ambitious set-up, however, one shou1d seek to introduce a1so other inflation-driving factor,
such as for instance import-price driven inflation. The latter wil dep end on inflation abroad, and the
exchange rate between 10ca1 and foreign currencies. The latter wil in its turn probab1y (over time) re-
flect the difference in 10cal and foreign inflation rates in the "near past" or simi1ar.
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argument that high and low inflation "extremes" are both detrimental to economic
growth, while more "reasonable" rates of inflation tend to promote the prospects for
such growth.
Towards concrete formulas
In trying to identify the concrete formulas and parameters of the functions outlne d
above, it may seem obvious that one should follow the usual procedure ofrelying on
the "statistical evidence" at hand, i.e. ofinvestigating what can be inferred from the
historical record of the variables concerned. In most cases this wil be preferable to
the alternative ofrelying on "proxy- information" (referrng to "corresponding" vari-
ables covering "similar" institutions elsewhere), unsubstantiated assumptions or
similar.
To undertake a proper econometric investigation ofthis nature promises to become a
substantial task. It has consequently not been attempted as par of the present very
limited effort. The job therefore remains to be done. However, before deciding to
launch such an investigation one should first address a few pertinent questions.
The first question concerns the risk of duplicating work already done by others. In the
present case it appears that the BOT may already have done the job in question. Thus,
a mission statement for the Bank's Directorate of Economic Policy, given in the ear-
lier mentioned BOT web site, informs us that:
"Econometric studies carried out by the Bank of Tanzania have indicated that
there is a relatively signifcant relationship over the longer term between
changes in M3, Prices (National Consumer Price Index, NCPI), and nominal
GDP (Gross Domestie Produet). "
The Macmod team should obviously look carefully into the feasibility of employing
the results of the BOT studies also for the current Macmod purpose, before deciding
whether or not there is a need to launch any new studies of the econometric relation-
ship between money supply, inflation and production.
The second question concerns the issue of relevance. When considering the likely
benefits of employing econometric evidence or similar to identify the monetary func-
tions ofMacmod one should not take it for granted that such evidence is in fact capa-
ble of providing the answers we are looking for.
In other words: we should not overlook the possible that econometric evidence re-
flecting Tanzania's past economic record may be unsuitable for our purpose. Even if
given econometric results or similar should prove impressive in respect of past events,
they do not necessarily provide us with a valid guide to the future. Our effort to
"capture the future" may in some cases be better served by our own best guesses than
by the "evidenee of the past".
Relevance of historical evidence
The above possibility seems particular relevant in the present case. The existing data
on inflation and production are limit ed in scope, in the sense that they are incapable of
ilustrating the complete form of the relationship between these variables. Thus, no
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data wil be on hand to ilustrate the effect ofnegative inflation. Admittedly, this may
not be too serious; negative inflation does not seem a likelyalternative given present
Tanzanian realities. What is decidedly worse is the fact that that the existing data are
also unlikely to be capable of showing the effects of an "appropriately" low rate of
inflation, i.e. ofrelating more precisely to the stated objective of present monetary
policies.
The available data are also "structurally" out of date. Economic relationships are not
unchangeable entities, given once and all. Their strength and character may alter sig-
nificantly over time, and in response to changing circumstances. So also in the present
case; the character and magnitude of Tanzania's monetary aggregates has changed
significantly during the last decade and a half, as has (presumably) the nature of their
impact upon the rest of the economy.
During this period, the country saw the introduction of fundamental changes in its
economic policies and practices. The "Tanzanian model" was initially a heavily state-
controlled one, but has become much more market oriented in recent years. In the past
state institutions of various kinds were also, to a significant degree, allowed to "drve"
the money supply. This they could do simply by showing poor budget discipline, per-
sistently allowing expenditures to exceed incomes.
The outcome may have been a fairly close association between "material" dem and
and monetar expansion.30 This kind of monetar expansion should now be a thing of
the past. In future, all institutions will have to show better budget discipline, abiding
by their budget limit, and refraining from monetizing their deficits. These develop-
ments wil be reinforced in the years ahead, and their impact on the overall economy
wil grow ever more visible. Given this state of affairs, there must be some doubt
about the relevanee of using the experience of the past as a guide towards the future.
This is not to deny that ambitious economic modelling efforts like Macmod often call
for substantial amounts of analysis of past events. Even so, the simple fact should not
be overlooked that the justification for constructing these mo dels is rarely the compul-
sion to analyse the events of the past as such. The analysis of these events is mainly
important to the modelling exercise in so far as it discloses how the various structures
of the economy operate. But this is normally done as a guide towards the future, on
the assumption that the structure etc studied does not change significantly or rapidly
over time. If this is the case, a sound understanding of past events will greatly benefit
the more "forward-looking" tasks, such as economic planning and predietion tasks.
It is recalled that our present project is derived from a wish to see monetary variables
and functions introduce into the Macmod modeL. The implication of the above obser-
vations for this proj ect is evident. The relationships and coeffcients introduced should
(to the best of our knowledge and ability) reflect the nature of future conditions. They
may be equated to the parallei ones observed in the past, but only if the relevant
structures of the future can be relied upon to be reasonably simI1ar in strength and
character to those of the past.
30 Note that this association between "material" demand and monetary expansion did not come about
because the money supp1y created the "material" demand, but because the latter was financed by
"money" created though the issuing of "uncovered" cheques, purchase order etc. The direction of de-
pendence between the two variab1es is therefore the reversed ofwhat is normally the case.
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In the present case there may be serious doubts that this wil indeed be the case, given
the fundamental changes in Tanzania's economic regime already mentioned. An in-
vestigation ofthe monetary aspects ofthe Tanzanian economy in the past may conse-
quently prove of rather limited relevanee to the model building effort, even if it
should come out with relatively c1ear and convincing conclusions etc in itself.
Concluding remarks
The Macmod practitioners initially referred to have c1early foreseen the possibility
that the past may be oflimited relevanee for the future. Thus, it is recalled from CMI
Report R1998:5 that they expect the traditional Keynesian "transmission mecha-
nism,,31 to operated in the future, even though it did obviously not do so in the past.
In support of this expectation they forward the same type of arguments as presented
above. Thus, they maintain that past expansions of the Tanzanian money supply
probably reflected the credit requirements of the governent and its various ancilar
institutions. In future, however, they expect things to be different. As the new eco-
nomic realities take effect they expect the traditional Keynesian transmission mecha-
nism to become more prominent.
The present author agrees that this is a likely development. This does not imply, how-
ever, that he expects it to come into absolute or real prominence in the near future,
only that one should expect it to grow increasingly more important over time (relative
to an initial situation in which it must have been a very marginal phenomenon in-
deed). Looking towards the near future, therefore, he expects other factors than the
Keynesian to be the primary determinants of the nation's investment decisions.
Looking further into the future, however, he expects the Keynesian mechanism to
gradually grow in importance, reflecting the development of the economy.
As seen in this perspective the employment of the Kenyesian transmission mechanism
is c1early a relevant proposition for the future. It is therefore advisable that the
Macmod investment function takes it on board. This it may do already today. Though
probably stil of relatively minor importance, one should not rule it out completely as
a potentially relevant investment determinant.
One should not, however, rely on the Keynesian transmission mechanism as the only,
or the main, investment determinant. The investment function ought to be "wide"
enough to encompass what we consider the main investment factors, even if these can
not be properly "intemalised" within the Macmod modeL.
Further works may be needed to pinpoint exactly what "drives" the investment deci-
sions in an economy like Tanzania's (i.e. an economy undergoing rapid changes, not
least in terms of overall policy matters). At this stage we wil only forward the idea
that the presenee or absenee ofwhat we may term "investors' confidence" is probably
of crucial importance.
31 Le. the mechanism though which variations in money supp1y trans lates into variations in economic
demand (via the interest rate and investment demand), giving rise to paralleI variations in production.
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This implies that investments will not materialise unless the authorities in question are
able to convince the potential investors that their investments are profitable and safe
both in the short and long term perspective. This may typically mean that the authori-
ties have to demonstrate, by word and deed, that legal and economic conditions will
remain reasonably stable and predictable, that governent is eamestly committed to
the reform policies initiated, that it is in practice able to maintain areasonably degree
of "good govemance" , etc.
These factors are unlikely to present themselves as feasible "internal variables" in the
mode!. The above arguments consequently imply that investments are to a significant
degree decided by exogenous factors (i.e. exogenous to the model). This being the
case, it may perhaps seem that we "al10w" the monetary variables and authorities of
Tanzania no more than a subordinate role
This, however, would amount to a misconception. Thus, as already argued elsewhere,
the present author agrees with the Bank of Tanzania that the money supply impacts
the rate ofinflation, and that the latter can "make or break" the country's development
prospects. In all probability, "extreme" rates of inflation are effective deterrents to
real-economy growth, while more "reasonable" rates are conducive to such growth.
Areasonable degree of price stability and price predictability should consequently be
seen as a necessary precondition for economic growth. Failing to achieve reasonable
success in this arena, the country is unlikely to succeed in creating economic devel-
opment. But, as emphasised earlier, price stability and predictability is not a suffcient
condition for economic growth; other factors must also come into play. As seen in this
perspective, therefore, the monetary authorities play a crucial enabling role in the
struggle for economic development.
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Annex I : A note about correlation coefficients etc.
It is recalled that a correlation coefficient of 0.92 between aggregate money (M2) and
production (GDP) was given in table 3.3 ofthe CMI Report (R1998:5) cited in the
introduction chapter. This may seem an impressively high value, suggesting astrong
link between the two variables. However, it would be inappropriate to jump to the
conclusion that a given M2 value will definitely giv e rise to a corresponding GDP
value.
This is not to deny that the said correlation coeffcient confirms astrong tendency for
GDP to grow with aggregate money supply (during the period investigated), and vice-
versa. It may be tempting to interpret this in terms of causality, sugge sting that the
money supply is a drving force behind GDP growth, (or, alternatively, that GDP
changes causes changes in money supply). The correlation coefficient, however, does
not in itself carr any such suggestion of causality; it simply measures the "statistical
association" between the variables in question.
In order to investigate the question of causality we must first formulate a specific hy-
pothesis of causality between the variables in question. This hypothesis should be ex-
pressed in terms of a linear function between the dependent and the independent var-
ables (i.e. between the "impacted' and the "impacting" variables).32
Having done so, we may employ standard regression tools to estimate the individual
coefficients of the prescribed function, and to assess the "goodness of fit" of the
whole function. The latter describes how "successful" the function is in explaining the
observed variations in the dependent variable, given the observed variations in the
independent variables.
The success rate is measured by the coeffcient of determination, commonly referred
to as: R2, or (preferably) by its adjusted version33. The magnitude ofthis coefficient
indicates how much of the variation in the dependent variable may be "explained" by
the variations in the independent variable, given the structural assumption.
Retuming to case reported in the CMI Report (R1998:5), the adjusted R2 is calculated
at 0.85. Although significantly below the 0.92 correlation coeffcient described above,
this is still an impressive result, implying that 85% of the variation in the dependent
variable is "explained" by the variations in the independent variable.34 In other words:
the presumed relationship between money and production leaves only 15% ofthe
varations in the dependent varable unexplained.
32 Note that the functiona1 re1ationship should be given a linear form, for instance: Yi = A + B*Xi. Non-
1inearity of a kind may nevertheless be obtained by "trans lating" the variab1es (X and Y) into a 10g-
normal format or simi1ar.
33 The unadjusted version ofR2 is equa1 to the square of the corre1ation coeffcient. The latter is calcu-
1ated as: Rxy = 'iX¡Yi / (Yl.x/ -Vl.y/), where: Xi~X¡ - X'Vg and y¡ = Yi - Y.vg (Le. deviations from mean).
The adjusted version ofR2 is based on the unadjusted R2, but adjusted for "degrees offreedom" etc, i.e.
as adjusted for possible "data inadequacies" (typically data scarcity).
34 Note that this R2 va1ue applies to both regression a1tematives; the va1ue ofR2 is the same irrespective
ofwhether GDP is presumed to drive or be driven by M2. (NB: this is the case for R2 a10ne, not for any
of the other regression coefficients or estimates.)
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Annex Il : Some basic data
Table Al Monetary Survey for mainland Tanzania (TZS'Bilion)
P1us: Equa1s: P1us: Equa1s: Plus: Equa1s:
Currency Demand Narrow Time & Broad F oreign Extended
Year in circula- deposits money savings money currency broad
tion (Ml) deposits (M2) deposits money
(M3)
1985*) 12,7 12,6 25,3 13,7 38,9 0,2 39,0
1986 18,3 17,5 35,8 14,4 50,2 0,1 50,4
1987 24,6 22,6 47,1 19,0 66,1 0,3 66,5
1988 31,7 33,7 65,4 23,9 89,3 0,5 89,8
1989 41,1 41,3 82,4 32,4 114,8 1,5 116,3
1990 57,9 53,2 111,1 52,1 163,2 3,5 166,7
1991 63,6 72,3 135,9 69,9 205,8 5,8 211,6
1992 95,5 90,4 185,9 99,1 285,0 17,0 301,9
1993 122,2 124,9 247,1 120,0 367,1 53,5 420,6
1994 176,3 153,3 329,6 156,9 486,5 83,3 569,7
1995 244,3 184,0 428,3 185,4 613,7 139,2 752,9
1996 257,7 191,6 449,2 235,8 685,0 133,1 818,1
1997 287,9 206,0 493,9 266,5 760,4 166,7 927,1
1998 307,8 237,7 545,5 299,4 844,9 182,1 1 027,0
Anual averages for se1ected periods:
1985-88 21,8 21,6 43,4 17,8 61,2 0,3 61,4
1989-93 76,0 76,4 152,5 74,7 227,2 16,3 243,4
1994-98 254,8 194,5 449,3 228,8 678,1 140,9 819,0
cont.
Extended of which:
broad Net N et claims Lending to Other
Year money foreign on gov- private & items,
(M3) assets enuent parastatals net
1985*) 39,0 -10,8 32,3 17,4 -6,9
1986 50,4 -12,9 32,6 27,6 3,1
1987 66,5 -19,9 35,6 55,0 -4,1
1988 89,8 -23,3 51,6 73,5 -12,0
1989 116,3 -22,1 60,1 106,8 -28,4
1990 166,7 6,4 54,2 145,5 -39,4
1991 211,6 20,1 39,7 198,2 -46,3
1992 301,9 47,9 72,9 189,3 -8,2
1993 420,6 27,1 184,1 245,8 -36,3
1994 569,7 116,4 181,1 280,2 -7,9
1995 752,9 165,8 279,3 247,8 60,0
1996 818,1 290,3 295,8 141,3 90,6
1997 927 ,l 398,9 239,5 183,0 105,7
1998 1 027,0 458,0 276,6 248,3 44,1
Armua1 averages for se1ected periods:
1985-88 61,4 -16,7 38,0 43,4 -5,0
1989-93 243,4 15,9 82,2 177,1 -31,7
1994-98 819,0 285,9 254,4 220,1 58,5
*) ,The 1985 entries do not balance.
Source: Macmod data file and Bank of Tanzania web site.
NB: Estimates refer to end of December.
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Table A2: Monetary and production aggregates
Monetary Aggregates Production Aggregates
Monetary Non-Mon. Total
Year Ml M2 M3 GDp.) GDp.) GDp.)
A: Absolute values (TZS'mil.)
1986 35810 50 235 50 353 720 430 280 839 1 001 269
1987 47131 66 137 66 495 780765 290775 1 071 540
1988 65401 89 339 89 809 818260 300758 1 119018
1989 82419 114 807 116295 835 927 311818 1 147745
1990 111 085 163 153 166 669 895674 323 562 1 219236
1991 135 926 205 818 211 579 920 422 332 712 1 253 134
1992 185 876 284 968 301 926 935 248 340 669 1275917
1993 247091 367095 420636 929 623 351 383 1 281 006
1994 329 625 486 489 569743 940 529 358413 1 298 942
1995 428 285 613 695 752 912 970 604 374 642 1 345 246
1996 449213 684991 818 063 1 015 509 386202 1 401 711
1997 493 869 760353 927069 1 048 168 399922 1 448 090
B: Annual increases (% pa)
1986 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1987 31,6 % 31,7 % 32,1 % 8,4% 3,5 % 7,0%
1988 38,8 % 35,1 % 35,1 % 4,8% 3,4 % 4,4%
1989 26,0% 28,5 % 29,5 % 2,2% 3,7% 2,6%
1990 34,8% 42,1 % 43,3 % 7,1 % 3,8% 6,2%
1991 22,4% 26,1 % 26,9% 2,8% 2,8 % 2,8%
1992 36,7 % 38,5 % 42,7% 1,6% 2,4% 1,8 %
1993 32,9 % 28,8 % 39,3 % -0,6% 3,1 % 0,4%
1994 33,4 % 32,5 % 35,4% 1,2 % 2,0% 1,4%
1995 29,9% 26,1 % 32,1 % 3,2% 4,5 % 3,6%
1996 4,9% 11,6 % 8,7% 4,6% 3,1 % 4,2%
1997 9,9% 11,0% 13,3 % 3,2% 3,6% 3,3 %
') GDP at factor cost, measured in constant 1992 pnces.
Source: Macmod data file and Bank of Tanzania web site.
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Table A3: GDP at Factor Cost, by Monetary and Non-Monetary component
At Current Prices At Constant 1992 Prices
Non- Non-
Monetarv Monetarv Total Monetarv Monetarv Total
A: Abso1ute Va1ues (TZS'bilion)
1986 157 67 224 720 281 1001
1987 217 86 303 781 291 1072
1988 323 145 468 818 301 1 119
1989 415 167 582 836 312 1 148
1990 562 198 760 896 324 1219
1991 730 260 990 920 333 1253
1992 935 341 1276 935 341 1276
1993 1 180 428 1608 930 351 1281
1994 1523 603 2125 941 358 1299
1995 2015 781 2797 971 375 1345
1996 2451 1001 3453 1016 386 1402
1997 3003 1278 4282 1048 400 1448
B : Percentage breakdown
1986 70% 30% 100 % 72% 28 % 100 %
1987 72% 28% 100% 73 % 27% 100 %
1988 69% 31 % 100 % 73 % 27% 100%
1989 71 % 29% 100 % 73 % 27% 100 %
1990 74% 26% 100 % 73 % 27 % 100 %
1991 74% 26% 100% 73 % 27 % 100 %
1992 73 % 27% 100 % 73 % 27% 100%
1993 73 % 27% 100% 73 % 27% 100 %
1994 72% 28 % 100 % 72% 28 % 100 %
1995 72% 28 % 100% 72% 28 % 100 %
1996 71 % 29% 100 % 72% 28 % 100 %
1997 70% 30% 100% 72% 28% 100%
Source: Macmod data file and Bank of Tanzania web site.
Table A4 Implied GDP price deflators
Index va1ue (Base 1992 = 100) Armua1 % pa price increases
Year Monetary Non-Mon. Total Monetary Non-Mon. Total
1986 0,218 0,240 0,224 NA NA NA
1987 0,278 0,295 0,282 27,3 % 23,1 % 26,0%
1988 0,395 0,481 0,418 42,2% 63,1 % 48,1 %
1989 0,496 0,537 0,507 25,6 % 11,6% 21,3 %
1990 0,627 0,613 0,623 26,4% 14,2 % 22,9%
1991 0,793 0,780 0,790 26,5 % 27,2 % 26,7%
1992 1,000 1,000 1,000 26,1 % 28,2% 26,6%
1993 1,270 1,217 1,255 27,0% 21,7 % 25,5 %
1994 1,619 1,681 1,636 27,5 % 38,2 % 30,4%
1995 2,076 2,086 2,079 28,2 % 24,0% 27,1 %
1996 2,414 2,593 2,463 16,2 % 24,3 % 18,5 %
1997 2,865 3,196 2,957 18,7 % 23,3 % 20,0%
Source: Based on the data oftable A3.
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Table A5: The macro budget
Supp1y Demand
components Total components Errors
GDP at supp1y Private Gov. con Private Gov. Change and omis
Year market Imports (& de- con- sumpt. invest- invest- Exports in stocks sions
orice mand) sumpt. ments ments
A: Abso1ute va1ues, at constant 1992 prices, TZS'bilion
1987 1 154 481 1635 952 229 302 23 120 3 6
1988 1201 477 1678 987 250 230 21 131 3 56
1989 1246 491 1 737 1032 224 237 13 140 4 89
1990 1334 507 1 841 1 110 237 324 12 155 4 -1
1991 1362 517 1879 1 131 273 354 23 139 4 -44
1992 1370 539 1909 1 133 269 335 34 170 4 -37
1993 1386 601 1988 1 154 239 286 42 221 4 43
1994 1408 575 1983 1172 220 294 37 247 4 9
1995 1458 610 2069 1223 203 269 13 328 4 30
1996 1525 561 2086 1278 169 264 10 329 4 32
1997 1578 403 1981 1310 135 252 23 247 4 10
B : Percentage distribution
1987 71 % 29% 100 % 58% 14% 18 % 1 % 7% 0% 0%
1988 72% 28% 100 % 59% 15 % 14 % 1 % 8% 0% 3%
1989 72% 28 % 100% 59% 13 % 14% 1 % 8% 0% 5%
1990 72% 28% 100% 60% 13 % 18 % 1 % 8% 0% 0%
1991 72% 28% 100% 60% 15 % 19 % 1 % 7% 0% -2 %
1992 72% 28% 100% 59% 14 % 18 % 2% 9% 0% -2 %
1993 70% 30% 100% 58 % 12 % 14% 2% 11 % 0% 2%
1994 71 % 29% 100% 59% 11 % 15 % 2% 12 % 0% 0%
1995 71 % 29% 100 % 59% 10% 13 % 1 % 16 % 0% 1 %
1996 73 % 27% 100% 61 % 8% 13 % 0% 16% 0% 2%
1997 80% 20% 100% 66% 7% 13 % 1 % 12 % 0% 0%
Source: Macmod data file
